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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT D. KLEIN,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No. 13994

vs.
MARY AVALON KLEIN,
Defendant and
Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The purpose of this Reply Brief is to respond to
and answer certain issues discussed by the Defendant-Respondent
in her Brief, to aid in the determination of this matter, if,
for any reason, the Plaintiff's formal acceptance of the Defendant's offer of settlement, which appears at the conclusion
of this brief, should not be considered to have disposed of the
Plaintiff's appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT'S ANALYSIS OF THE POSTURE OF THIS CASE
ON APPEAL IS NOT SUPPORTED BY AUTHORITIES OR BY REASON AND
IS IN ERROR.
The Defendant's Brief contends that if the stipuDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

lated Judgment of December
18,
iserrors.
set aside, the Judgment
Machine-generated
OCR,1974
may contain

of November 11, 1974 should be considered reinstated.
It is the Plaintifffs contention that the Judgment
of November 11, 1974 was merged into the Judgment of December
18, 1974 (see cases cited at page 18 of Plaintiff's original
Brief) and, therefore, that if the Judgment of December 18,
1974 is set aside, there will be no Judgment outstanding.

It

follows that this case will, technically, be in an interlocutory
posture before this Court, but eligible for review under the
doctrine of Schurtz v. Thorley, 90 Utah 381, 61 P.2d 1262
(1936).

The Defendant cites no authorities and offers no

reasoning to the contrary.

But should the Judgment of November

11, 1974, not be found to have merged into the Judgment of
December 18, 1974, the Defendant cites no line of reasoning
and no authority indicating that the Plaintiff would not be
restored to his position prior to the settlement proceedings
of December 9, 1974, and why the hearing of his Objections
to Judgment of November 11, 1974 should not be resumed and
completed.
POINT II
THE STATEMENT OF FACTS IN DEFENDANT'S BRIEF CONTAINS
NUMEROUS ERRORS OF FACT, CONSISTENTLY DISTORTS THE FACTS AND
DISCUSSES THE ISSUE OF FAULT EXTENSIVELY DESPITE ITS BEING
EXCLUDED BY THE TRIAL COURT FROM CONSIDERATION IN THIS MODIFICATION PROCEEDING. THE PLAINTIFF MUST THEREFORE REPLY TO AND
CORRECT DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS.
This marriage was entered into in 1953 and was terminated in 1972.

It was the first marriage for the Plaintiff

and the second for the Defendant.

At the time of the divorce,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the Plaintiff was 50 and the Defendant was 48. The Plaintiff
entered into this marriage largely out of sense of moral obligation (Record 207). It has been an emotionally barren union,
characterized by separate beds and several periods of separation (Record 206).
The Plaintiff is self-educated in his trade as a land
developer.

The Defendant describes the Plaintiff as "intel-

ligent" and "articulate" but this is no less true of the Defendant.

She is a strong-willed, domineering (Record 208, 211),

and articulate woman (Record 211). It is stated in the Defendant^ Brief that the Plaintiff regards himself as an "academic"
and his friends as "semi-educated", citing testimony at page
210 of the Record.

The testimony which the Defendant cites

is actually to the opposite effect.

The Plaintiff testifies,

at page 210:
My interests and friends range in a semi-educated
level. I think, by (the Defendant's) laughing, she
doesn1t feel comfortable in this situation, or, at
least, it is so indicated. So the friends we have
made have been the friends of her selection; . . ."
(Emphasis Added.)
In fact, the Defendants deprecation of the Plaintifffs educational background and manner of expression has been a major
cause of the failure of the marriage.

(Record 207).

Although the Defendant alleges poor health, there
have been no findings to that effect in the original Decree of
Divorce or the subsequent modification thereof.
The Defendants Brief states:
During the marriage, the parties lived in rather
stylish fashion: a $100,000 home and a membership
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

at Willow Creek, a twin-engine plane and several trips
a year to Palm Springs, Las Vegas, Aspen and California;
entertaining and eating out; Lincoln Continentals;
two or three trips a year to California, Phoenix,
Catalina (T 1381, 1382 and 1493) and the Appellant
enjoyed the luxury of gambling losses (T 1492),
The picture of luxury thus painted by the Defendant
is utterly false.

The facts are that the home and the Willow

Creek membership, which now belong to the Defendant, were the
only luxuries regularly enjoyed by the parties.

The hard evi-

dence of the actual standard of living enjoyed by the parties,
evidence which the Defendant has nowhere disputed, is that the
living expenses of the Klein household were strictly confined
to one $350 monthly house payment and one twice-monthly check
for $175 given the Defendant from which the remaining living
expenses were met.

(Record 1484.)

The remaining portion of

the Plaintiff1s income, which his income tax returns reveal
averaged $20,600 per year for-the five (5) years prior to the
modification proceedings, was applied to the purchase money
debt on the business assets of the marital estate.

(Record

272-83.)
The Defendant's Brief mentions Lincoln Continentals
and a twin-engine plane, clearly implying that these were
marital assets of the parties and an integral part of their
life-style.

The parties operated two (2) Lincoln Continentals

over the 19 year course of the marriage, the last one of which
was still in use after 140,000 miles. At the time of the divorce,
a 1966 Chevrolet registering 120,000 miles was found to be
the parties1 only personal car (Record 168). The twin-engine
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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should not be overlooked.
The parties have three (3) sons, aged 15, 19 and 21.
The oldest is presently serving a mission for the L.D.S. Church.
Only the youngest is presently living with the Defendant.

An

important cause of the divorce was the Plaintiff's feeling of
powerlessness in the upbringing of his sons and an important
reason for the Plaintiff remarrying since the Divorce Decree
is to provide a family base for those of his sons who choose
to live with him and follow his guidance.

Foremost in the Plain-

tiff's mind in pursuing this appeal, though the percentages
may be against him, is to preserve an opportunity for him to
bring his sons up in his business, which opportunity the Plaintiff feels he will lose if the Judgment of the trial court is
sustained and the Plaintiff is forced to meet the crushing debt
burden left upon him by that Judgment by selling his business
properties at distress prices.
The Plaintiff's monthly income of $1,436 is in the
form of salary from the corporate complex in which he is a
minority stockholder.

His marital obligations, together with

his business debts, far exceed his income.

The trial court's

Judgment leaves the Plaintiff with the following monthly expenses
(Record 418):
A.

Alimony § Child Support

$600.00

B.

Mortgage on home with taxes and
insurance

358.00

C.

Medical Expenses (for children)

100.00

D.

Interest
occurring
on business
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
related indebtedness
with
Machine-generated OCR, may
containno
errors.

E.

40.00

..•• ; urns

PLAINTJ:
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» \J \J

Living Lxpei .
Present Wife

'

I'l A I NT I I I'1 \ I'OIAI MON'I'lll.'i EXPENSES

$2,353.00

300_. 00

,436.00

Less Plaintiff's total monthly income

($917.00)

PLAINTIFF'S TOTAL MONTHLY DEFICIT
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Southern Utah, whose value can only be realized by gradual
pay-as-you-go development over the long-term.
Contrast the Plaintiff's financial plight with the
Defendant's financial condition.

\

The Defendant's Brief opines:

Since the divorce, the Respondent has lived
poorly. She can't afford to take vacations; she can
no longer entertain; she can no longer drive a Lincoln.
She and the children cannot afford to go to shows
together as a family (T 1382, 1383). She has attempted
to supplement her income and works many hours a day
and holds open houses on listed properties on Saturdays
and Sundays (T 1383). She has spent hours at the job
but has earned very little money (T 1384).
The Defendant's own Affidavit shows her monthly income

as follows:
A.

Gross Alimony and Child Support

B.

Earnings from her employment
as a real estate agent, a sum
averaging approximately $500
per month

500.00

House payment being paid by
the Plaintiff

358.00

C.
D.

Country Club Dues

E.

Health and Accident Insurance
for children - amount unknown

$600.00

47.00

DEFENDANT'S TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME

$1,505.00

If the Defendant has lived poorly, in her $100,000
home, with her country club membership and $1,500 per month
income, the responsibility for her "poor" living standard, her
inability to entertain, to drive a Lincoln, to take the family
to shows, etCo is hers alone.

Some light can be shed on the

cause of her "poor living" by examining her Affidavit of expenses
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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asset of the marital estate, all or part of the Seegmiller
property, appraised at $416,000 by"the Defendant, must be excluded
from the marital estate on the ground that a vested interest
in it was not acquired until after a Memorandum Decision of
Divorce had been rendered adopting a proposed division of the
marital property.
It is also asserted in Point II of the Plaintiff's
original Brief, at page 34, that the speculative real properties
now held by the parties under low-equity installment purchase
contracts should be considered to be inventory without which
the Plaintiff cannot practice his trade as a land developer
and, as such, are properly classified as business inventory rather
than marital assets.

The original Decree of Divorce which assigne

nominal values to these properties and awarded them to the Plaintiff was based on this reasoning.

The original Decree reserved

limited jurisdiction to modify the Decree if the concept of
treating the speculative properties as business, inventory rather
than marital assets should result in

f,

serious financial distressM

to either party (982 Record at 1010-11, 562 Record at 663-64
and 665).
Instead of directly stating the holding of this Court
in

Klein v. Klein, 30 Utah2d 1, 511 P.2d 1284 (1973), the Defen-

dant's brief offers a list of isolated sentences extracted at
random from that opinion.

At the head of that list are the

following quotations:
"This seems to be a rather unusual order.11
fl

We think this was highly improper and may
M
have
been
prejudicial.
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

These quotations are extremely misleading when presented
out of context in this reckless manner.

They were not made in refer-

ence to the original divorce decree or the property division contained therein as the Defendant implies, but to separate issues.
The first statement refers to a procedural order issued prior to
trial; the second to a letter received by the trial court.
(Record 211.)
The Defendant's Statement of Facts discusses the issue
of whether the Findings of Fact accompanying the original Decree
of Judge Faux and those accompanying the modification thereof
by Judge Taylor are supported by the evidence.

In that regard,

it quotes Finding No. 17 entered November 11, 1974 by Judge
Taylor:
The inadequacy and inaccuracy of the original
and amended Firmlngs, Conclusions and Decree, resulted
from either the unknowing and unconscious prejudice
of the initial judge who tried this matter, or as
a result of his misunderstanding of the facts. The
error of the trial court who tried this case in the
first instance" was in failing to properly describe,
define and itemize substantial portions of the property accumulated during the marriage and to assign
values with respect to said properties, and to include
said values in a determination of the net marital
estate. (Emphasis added.) (Record 387.)
If any findings are unsupported by the evidence, it is Finding
No. 17.

The Findings of November 22, 1972 accompanying the

original Judgment of Judge Faux describe, define, itemize and
assign a value to every asset that has been reevaluated in the
modification hearing before Judge Taylor.

Several assets including

the stock of Ilolidair Lands, Inc., and the Sandberg land purchase
contract, to which the November 11, 1974 Findings of Judge Taylor
assign substantial market values, were expressly assigned a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

zero value by the November 11, 1972 Findings of Judge Faux,
along with the reasons for doing so.

For example,

Holidair

Lands, Inc. was. found valueless because the corporation itself
was found to be a shell. Accordingly, the November 22, 1972
Findings valued Holidair Lands' underlying assets rather than
its stock (Finding No. 7(G), November 22, 1972 Findings and
Conclusions, 163 Record at 166). In those original Findings,
the Sandberg land purchase contract is assigned a zero value
because the parties held no equity in the contract.

The Plaintiff

respectfully requests the members of this Court to examine the
November 22, 1972 Findings of Judge Faux for the purpose of
finding any significant marital asset that was not described,
defined, itemized, and assigned a value.

It is Finding No.

17 of the November 11, 1974 Findings of Judge Taylor that
has been shown to be based on an exceedingly superficial
reading of the November 22, 1972 Findings, to be inaccurate
as a result and to be unsupported by the evidence.
More seriously, Finding No. 17 of Judge Taylor's
November 11, 1974 Findings and Conclusions expressly finds
"error" and "unconscious prejudice" by a court of equal
jurisdiction.

Finding No. 17 is by itself reversible error,

both because it is unsupported by the evidence and because
it constitutes appellate review of a court of co-equal jurisdiction.
The Defendant's Brief repeatedly emphasizes that
the Plaintiff has not made a blanket assertion that the
marital property values found by the modifying court were
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unsupported by the evidence.
tion escapes the Plaintiff.

The significance of this observaThere are some valuations which

the Plaintiff does not-contest.

Those which the Plaintiff

contests are expressly challenged on the basis of errors of
fact and/or law.
The Defendant's Brief states that the properties
awarded to the Defendant by the Judgment of November 11,
1974 have a total value of $743,287.35 and that those awarded
her by the Judgment of December 18, 1974 have a total value
of $543,287.35.

The Plaintiff's Brief calculates the respec-

tive amounts to be $743,287.35 (Plaintiff's Brief, Appendix
A-2) and $552,563.35 (Plaintiff's Brief, Appendix A-6).
The Plaintiff has since discovered that the $73,000 mortgage
debt allocated to the Defendant has been deducted twice on
the assets awarded to the Defendant, both by the Plaintiff
and the Defendant in their Briefs.

Therefore, $73,000 should

be added to the total amount awarded to the Defendant under
both judgments.

The correct total value of property awarded

the Defendant by the Judgments of November 11, 1974 and
December 18, 1974 is $816,287.35 and $625,563.35, respectively.
POINT III
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF NEITHER DISCUSSES NOR DISTINGUISHES
THE NUMEROUS AUTHORITIES CITED IN PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF SUPPORTING
THE STRONG MAJORITY RULE FORBIDDING THE ENTRY OF CONSENT JUDGMENTS
AGAINST A PARTY'S CONSENT. RATHER THAN DEFEND THE MINORITY
VIEW, THE DEFENDANT'S BRIEF CITES AUTHORITIES ADDRESSED TO
OTHER ISSUES.
The strong majority rule states that a consent judgment
is invalid if the consent of o'ne of the parties is lacking at
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the time the judgment is entered.

(See Freedle v. Moorefield,

17 N.C. 331, 194 S.E.2d 156 (1973); Farr v. McKinzie, 477 S.W.2d
672 (Tex.) (1972); Beazley v. Randolph, 409 S.W.2d 487 (Tex.)
(1966), and numerous additional authorities cited at page 11 of
Plaintiff's original Brief.)

The strong majority rule cited by

the Plaintiff applies where, as here, a party has made a timely
application to rescind the settlement agreement prior to the
entry of Judgment based thereon.

Where this set of facts exists,

the authorities are virtually unanimous in requiring actual consent
of both parties at the time a consent judgment is entered.

The

Plaintiff, after diligent search, has found no Utah case involving
this set of facts, and the Defendant's Brief cites none.

Rather

than acknowledge the majority rule or try to distinguish the
authorities supporting it, the Defendant refers to Johnson v.
Peoples Finance, 2 Utah 2d 246, 272 P.2d 171 (1954) and Bean
y. Carlos, 21 Utah 2d 309, 445 P.2d 144 (1918).

In both cases,

there was no petition to rescind a settlement agreement until
well after it had been breached and well after a judgment had
been entered.

Neither case determines the pow.-r of the trial

court to enter a consent judgment where a party has made a timely
petition to rescind the settlement agreement for cause, before
breach and before the entry of judgment, the only fact situation
relevant to this case.
Johnson, supra.

This distinction is expressly drawn by

While Johnson upholds the power of the trial court

to enforce a settlement agreement after breach by reducing it
to judgment, Johnson at the same time states the terms upon which
rescission of a settlement agreement are normally available:
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Applications for relief from stipulations
must be seasonably made. 50 Am; Jur. 613, 614.
We cannot say as a matter of law that plaintiffs
were entitled to relief after a period of that
(9 month) duration, particularly since the record
does not authoritatively show that the other parties
to the suit had not acted in reliance upon a stipulation and that the vacating of the stipulation
would not be unfair to them. In view of the state
of the record we must affirm the judgment. (2 72 P.2d
at 173.) (Emphasis added.)
Johnson, therefore, expressly acknowledges that where there is a
timely effort to rescind, no detrimental reliance by the opposing
party and no resulting injustice, rescission of a stipulation
is available.
Like Johnson, Bean v. Carlos, supra, is simply another
case where a motion to rescind a settlement was denied where it
was made long after its breach and long after the entry of judgment.
Bean relies completely upon Johnson and therefore preserves the
distinctions drawn there.
In summary, the cases cited by the Defendant involve
applications to vacate stipulated judgments made long after breach
and long after the entry of judgment.

They do not detract in any

way from a party's right to rescind a stipulated judgment for
cause where (1) his application is timely, being prior to any
breach of the settlement and prior to the entry of judgment,
and (2) the opposing party has not detrimentally relied and
therefore would suffer no injustice.

The Plaintiff's Brief

demonstrates that his application for rescission satisfies all
the prerequisites required by the strong majority rule for rescinding a consent to judgment.
The Defendant's Brief sneers at the possibility that
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the Plaintiff may not have been acquainted with the terms of
the settlement agreement, citing the Plaintiff's education,
intelligence, attendance at the hearings, etc.

Nowhere does

the Defendant explain how the Plaintiff could divine for himself
those terms of the settlement that were supplied to him only
in the form of numbers to paragraphs of a prior set of Findings
and Conclusions which he had never seen and had never been told
existed.

The Plaintiff was required to put together the economic

and legal puzzle of this extremely complex settlement on the
spur of the moment with only a handful of the pieces.

It should

be borne in mind that five months had elapsed since the modification hearings, that the most significant argument over the
division of the marital property had been in the form of posthearing briefs submitted by counsel and prepared during the Plaintiff's absence in St, George.

The issues presented during the

December 6 and 9, 1974 hearings on objections were difficult
enough for counsel and the trial court to follow, let alone the
Plaintiff, as a reading of those proceedings will demonstrate.
Indeed, several complications, apparently not fully understood
by Plaintiff's own counsel, contributed greatly to the impossible
nature of the settlement arrived at from the standpoint of the
Plaintiff's capacity to carry it out. Among those terms were
the requirement that the Plaintiff's stock in Major Enterprises
be delivered to the trial court and sold on the event of his
default, which directly violates the restrictions placed upon
the transfer of that stock by the legend upon the stock certificates themselves and the shareholder's agreement received in
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evidence during the modification hearing.

Another such term

was the lien in favor of the Defendant placed directly upon
the real property owned by third parties to these divorce proceedings in their capacity as shareholders of Holidair Lands,
Inc.

Another was the requirement that the Plaintiff pay $50,000

to the Defendant in such form that it would be taxable to him.
Had the Plaintiff understood the actual nature of these provisions,
the Plaintiff would never have consented to a settlement in that
form.
The following portion of the transcript demonstrates
that the Plaintiff was not acquainted with the bulk of the
terms of the settlement offer:
THE COURT: All-right. Mr. Klein, you have
heard your counsel read into the record, part of
it by reference to paragraphs. I don't know whether
you have been able to follow it or not.
MR. KLEIN:

I haven't followed it, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Do you understand it?

MR. KLEIN: I am relying on my counsel. At
this point, I haven't been able to see it.
The Defendant's brief

claims that this passage is ntaken

out of context" and "related only to one specific matter."
But the quoted exchange is general by its terms.
at the end of the settlement process.

It comes

If this exchange refers

to only one specific matter, the Defendant is challenged
to explain what, that matter was.

The Plaintiff requests

that the members of this Court read the above-quoted passage
for themselves, in context, and decide for themselves whether
it is anything other than a generalized response to a general
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and summarizing question put by the trial^court.
The Defendant asserts that the Plaintiff's depression and disorientation during the settlement proceeding
is a "self-serving, unsubstantiated and unsupported declaration that is not entitled to credibility."

The Court is

directed to the Affidavit of Steven R. Anderson, Vice-President
of Valley Bank $ Trust Company, dated January 17, 1975,
corroborating the Plaintiff's disoriented mental state immediately after the settlement proceedings0

Plaintiff's Rule

75 Memorandum of Authorities, item (i), on file with this
Court.
The Defendant extended an offer of settlement during
the hearing of Plaintiff's Objections to Judgment on December
9, 1974, wherein she offered to give up half of the Seegmiller
property which she had been awarded by the Judgment of November
11, 1974, in return for $50,000 in tax free cash payments from
the Plaintiff.

She claims that her offer was motivated by

nothing more than the benevolence of her character.

She goes

on to accuse the Plaintiff of having accepted her "selfless
peace offering" in bad faith, intending to extract all possible
concessions from her before taking an appeal from his settlement.
This is absurd.

The Defendant was prompted to initiate

a settlement offer only after the court had expressed its misgivings about the provision of the November 11, 1974 Judgment
awarding all of the Seegmiller property to the Defendant and
all of the corresponding debt to the Plaintiff.
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As for the

Plaintiff accepting her offer in bad faith, with the intent of
seeking rescission, such an accusation is preposterous.

It

requires one to believe that the Plaintiff arranged to have the
settlement offer read to him in undecipherable code by the Defendant's counsel just so he could later assert that fact as grounds
for an appeal.

It should be borne in mind that the Defendant

initiated well over half of the post-trial litigation in this
matter, that the Plaintiff's business pursuits have all but been
destroyed by these proceedings, that he has been required to
finance both sides of most of these proceedings at a time when
he has been desparately short of cash, and that, as even the
Plaintiff concedes, the posture of his appeal from the December
18, 1974 consent Judgment is substantially less favorable than
it would have been from the Judgment of November 11, 1974.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF FAILS TO GRASP THE NATURE OF THE
INEQUITY OF THE JUDGMENTS OF NOVEMBER 11, AND DECEMBER 18, 1974,
WHICH PROMPTS HIS APPEAL.
The Defendant's Brief relies on the fact that the
share of property awarded to the Plaintiff appears larger
than that awarded to the Defendant.

In the case of the

November 11, 1974 Judgment, the division is $931,602.63 to
Plaintiff and $816,287.35 to Defendant.

In the case of the

December 18, 1974 Judgment, the division is $1,131,602.63
to Plaintiff and $623,563.35 to Defendant.
If this estate consisted of cash or anything remotely
comparable, and if the-Plaintifffs complaint were that the
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percentage of the estate awarded to the parties is inequitable,
there would, of course be little ground for taking an appeal
from such division.

Most of the assets of this estate,

however, are not remotely comparable to cash assets and the
essence of the Plaintiff's complaint of inequity has little
to do with the percentages awarded either party.
The Defendant describes the marital estate as a
"million dollar empire."

The facts are that it is a "million

dollar empire" only in a hypothetical sense.

It is an estate

that could become a million dollar empire, but only after
a series of contingent events have occurred, events which
at this point appear unlikely to happen.
Due to the numerous conditions precedent to this estate
becoming a "million dollar empire", if the entire marital estate
were to be liquidated over a three month period, and federal
and state income taxes were taken into account, this entire estate
would yield in the neighborhood of $500,000 cash.

The lower

court judgment is inequitable to both parties because it is
oblivious to the estatefs precarious grip on its major assets
and the highly uncertain value of those assets. The remedy to
this inequity arising from the highly uncertain value of the
estate is to remove the encumbrances on the estate, make it whole,
make its business assets viable once again, allow the Defendant
to participate in it through appropriate adjustments in alimony
and reserve jurisdiction in order to protect the Defendant's
right to participate in the yield of the marital estate, should
the management of the marital estate ever appear to jeopardize
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that right.
The inequity of the tri.al court's Judgments appears
most clearly in the context of a discussion of the contingencies
upon which the values of the marital assets depend.
The first contingency that must occur before this
marital estate becomes a "million dollar empire" is the
discharge of the purchase money debt in the amount of $157,000
on the "Seegmiller",

ff

SandbergM, and "Pershing-Nelson" install-

ment land purchase contracts.

If $157,000 in cash is not

somehow raised from this estate by the end of this year, the
"Seegmiller", "Sandberg", and "Pershing-Nelson" properties,
valued by the trial court at roughly $1,112,000, will be lost.
(See page 30 of Plaintiff's original Brief.)

The estate's pre-

carious hold on these three assets can be appreciated when it
is realized that it holds equity of only $110,000 in these properties, assigned more than $1,100,000 of value by the trial
court.
The Plaintiff's original Brief, at page 30, demonstrates
that the marital estate has short-term cash requirements of
$300,000.

The prospects that $300,000 in cash can be extracted

from this estate in the immediate future are slim.

The

only source of cash in this estate is Plaintiff's salary,
which, as Plaintiff's original Brief has demonstrated, is,
too small to cover even the monthly interest on the purchase
money debt.

Since the estate has only $110,000 in equity

in the MSeegmillerff, nSandbergM, and MPershing-Nelsonff properties, and their value is so speculative, lenders will
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not accent them as collateral.

(Vl&cnrd 466-67.1

A<; r>vr>1 m'noH

in Plaintiff's original brief at pages 23-24, these properties
are tracts of raw desert, far from other built-up areas.
Real value will be imparted to them only after massive initial
investment in exploring for water, constructing utility
systems and providing urban services.

Without this initial

investment, any effort to raise cash by selling these properties a few acres at a time would yield a relative pittance.
The money needed to retire the purchase money debt
encumbering the bulk of this estate cannot come from this
estate's 49% interest in the stock of three land development
corporations--Major Enterprises, Award Homes and Dynamic
Corporation--valued at an incredible $800,000 by the trial
court.

These are all minority blocks of stock in closely

held corporations restricted from public sale by written shareholders1 agreements.

The only buyer for this stock is the 50%

shareholder, Verl O'Brien, who is entirely without available
funds to purchase additional investments of any kind.

(Record

422-24, 1568-72.)
There is no asset within this estate that can be
readily liquidated to yield the approximate $300,000 that, as
is explained at pages 30-31 of Plaintiff's Brief, is needed
in the short run to preserve its speculative business assets.
Under the present Judgment of the trial court, the only way
to extract this amount of ready cash from this estate is to liqui
date roughly half of its business assets at distress prices in
order to preserve the other.
As Plaintiff's original Brief points out, there can
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

be no argument that this sacrifice is necessary to meet the
immediate needs of the Defendant.

Her estimated alimony and

support payments of $1,500 per month are more than double the
living expenses of the entire Klein household prior to the divorce.
Plaintiff's original brief points out, as well, that there is
a clearly feasible way to avoid this major sacrifice of the
marital estate.

The Plaintiff's ability and long experience

as a land developer, the success of the land development corporations he founded, and, in particular, his experience and
understanding of the real estate market in the St. George area
demonstrate that, if given the chance, he could successfully
develop the marital estate's speculative real property and realize, for the benefit of both parties, their full potential values.
But the lower court Judgments, by encumbering and fragmenting these properties, have shackled and will continue to
shackle the Plaintiff in his efforts to develop them and realize
their full potential valueG

If the encumbrances upon these

properties were removed, if they were once again made whole and
their value as collateral restored, the Plaintiff could get their
development underway0

The benefits of such development could

accrue to both parties by making appropriate adjustments of the
alimony of the Defendant as the development progressed. Jurisdiction could be retained, as it was in the original Decree,
to be invoked by the Defendant if these assets should ever be
managed in such a way as to jeopardize the Defendant's opportunity
to benefit in the yield therefrom.

Such a property division would

prevent the forced liquidation of a major part of the marital
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

estate at prices far below its potential value and thereby prevent manifest injustice to both parties.

Property divisions

of this kind are historically sanctioned and have proven to be
a highly satisfactory method of solving the dilemma of how to
equitably divide marital property of contingent value,

Wooley

v. Wooley, 113 Utah 391, 195 P.2d 743 (1948); Dahlberg v. Dahlberg,
77 Utah 157, 292 P. 214 (1930).

The Defendant herself has acknowl-

edged the major contingencies to which the marital properties
are subject in her Memorandum and Proposal of the Defendant (Record
338-39).

There, as a remedy for such uncertainty, she proposed

a property division in the form of a schedule of cash payments
to herself, which is the substantial equivalent of a property
division cast in the form of alimony.
Another major uncertainty, upon which the "million
dollar" values depend is the lawsuit which must be won in order
to obtain title to the Sandberg property, valued by the trial
court at $511,000.

The trial court's Finding No. 19 of its

Findings and Conclusions of November 11, 1974 declares that there
is "risk and a possibility, but not a probability, that the
Sandberg acreage and the resulting values may be lost." But
nowhere in the record does any witness make such a contention,
and the record is entirely devoid of any evidence bearing on
the probability that the Sandberg lawsuit will be won or lost.
As the trial court's Judgment is framed, the marital
property is subjected to an additional major contingency whereby
the failure to secure certain assets of the marital estate
will have a dominoe effect, causing the whole estate to be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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lost.

If the Plaintiff cannot raise $230,000 in cash by the

end of this year, he will be unable to make the payment on
the Seegmiller mortgage and the initial payment on the $50,000
owed to the Defendant as required by the trial court Judgment, and
still meet the mortgage payments on the remainder of the marital
estate.

In that event,

his stock in Major Enterprises is to

be sold by the Court and applied to these obligations.

Such

a sale would yield virtually nothing on the open market and
this purportedly $543,000 asset would be sacrificed for nothing.
If the Plaintiff is deprived of his stock in this manner, his
salary from Major Enterprises, from which the debt on the entire
estate is serviced, would be jeopardized.

Should this occur,

and it is likely to occur unless the present Judgment is modified,
the entire marital estate, with the possible exception of the
St. George Sandpiper apartment complex, would be pulled under.
The Defendant's Brief purports to put the prospect of the collapse
of the marital estate

fl

in perspectiveM by observing that the

only difference between the financial obligations imposed upon
the Plaintiff by the Judgment of December 18, 1974 as opposed
to the Judgment of November 11, 1974 is the duty to pay the
Plaintiff cash installments of $50,000.

This observation

is not even addressed to the Plaintiff's argument.

The

Plaintiff has never contended that the later Judgment was

. •

more likely than the earlier Judgment to precipitate the
collapse of the marital estate.

The problem of raising approxi-

mately $300,000 needed in the short run to preserve the
marital assets (Plaintiff's Brief, pages 30-31) and the problem
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of the encumbrance and fragmentation of the marital properties
now standing in the way of their preservation, are common
to both Judgments.

Understandably, the Defendant's Brief

studiously avoids a discussion of this point raised in the
Plaintiff's original brief.
The Defendant's Brief argues that no inequity would
result from the lower court's Judgment since the estate's high
risk assets are evenly distributed and their loss would be borne
equally by the parties.

The Defendant, at page 28 of her Brief,

itemizes what she considers to be the risk assets awarded to
the respective parties as follows:
AWARD OF SPECULATIVE PROPERTIES:
TO APPELLANT:
A.

B.

Holidair Lands stock and contract
receivable on Sandberg and Nelson
properties, less $252,000.00 contingent payable to Respondent:

$448,762.50

600 acres of Seegmiller land:

$208,000.00

TOTAL SPECULATIVE TO APPELLANT:
'...,;.

,

' $656,762,50

TOTAL SPECULATIVE TO RESPONDENT:
A.

Contingent Holidair Land contract

$252,000.00

B.

600 acres of Seegmiller property:

$208,000.00

TOTAL SPECULATIVE TO RESPONDENT:

$460,000,00

She itemizes at page 27 of the Brief what she considers to
be the safe assets awarded to respective parties as follows:
TO APPELLANT;
A.

All of the stock in Major Enterprises and the other corporations,
with net values in excess of:

The Appellant's profit sharing
funds in Major Enterprises, with
Digitized by a
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B.
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$ 47,850.00

C.

The 3.1 acres of unimproved ground
in downtown St. George, with a
value of:

TOTAL NON-SPECULATIVE PROPERTIES
. AWARDED TO APPELLANT

$ 60,000,00
$907,850.00

TO RESPONDENT:
D.

The family resident in Salt Lake
City, with a value of:

$103,000.00

Stock in Intermountain Land $
Development Corporation (liquidated by Respondent):

$

F.

Receivable from Appellant:

$ 50,000.00

G.

The fourteen apartments in St.
George, with a net value of:

$ 33,000,00

E.

TOTAL NON-SPECULATIVE PROPERTIES
AWARDED TO RESPONDENT:

7,000.00

$193,000.00

From this itemization the Defendant concludes that if the risk
assets are lost, both parties lose equally.
is incomplete, to put it mildly.

This analysis

If certain risk assets, namely

the Seegmiller property, are lost, it is true they are lost
to both.

But the Defendant neglects to mention that her share

in that property is secured by the Plaintiff's nnon-speculativeM
assets, namely Plaintiffrs $543,000 worth of Major Enterprises
stock.

Under the present Judgment, the Plaintiff's hold on

both his risk and his safe assets is exceedingly precarious.
If the Seegmiller property is lost, the Plaintiff loses it and
his corporate stock, and when that is lost he has nothing with
which to service the debt on his remaining assets. As a result,
if the Seegmiller property is lost, the Plaintiff loses everything else as well.

The Defendant's contention that the risk
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inherent in this marital estate is equally and equitably distributed between the parties is baseless.
The Defendants Brief denies that the lower court
Judgment perpetuates a business partnership after the marital
partnership has been dissolved.

This is not the case.

For

example, the 3.1 acres of land surrounding the St. George Sandpiper apartments have been awarded to the Plaintiff, while the
apartments themselves standing in the center of this acreage
have been awarded to the Defendant.

Under these circumstances,

the Plaintiff cannot develop his lands, as a practical matter,
without the Defendant's approval.

Likewise, the Plaintiff and

Defendant are made abutting landowners in the Seegmiller property
and, as a practical matter, these properties, with respect to
roads, water, utilities and services, will have to be developed
cooperatively or not at all.

This is another inequity which

a property division in the form of alimony to the Defendant
would remedy.
The Plaintifffs partial loss of the marital estate's
developable lands and with it his opportunity to practice his
trade as a land developer is a further inequity of the lower
court Judgments.

Finding No. 18 of the Findings and Conclusions

of November 11, 1974 states:
The Plaintiff, ROBERT D. KLEIN, has the training, ability, experience, knowledge and know-how
to earn and continue to earn and accumulate substantial amounts of assets while the Defendant,
MARY AVALON KLEIN, does not.
Finding No. 18 fails to recognize that the Plaintiff's earning
ability thus described exists only to the extent that the
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developable lands of the marital estate remain at his disposal.
To the extent that the marital estate's developable lands are
lost to the Plaintiff, his earning ability and his opportunity
to practice his trade are lost. A further inequity of both
lower court Judgments is that they require the Defendant to
manage or dispose of substantial real property, which will place
a substantial burden on the Defendant who is without business
experience.

The loss to the Plaintiff and the burden on the

Defendant thus described are additional inequities which a property division in the form of alimony to the Defendant would
remedy.
POINT V
THERE ARE THREE PLAIN, CLEAR AND UNAVOIDABLE PREREQUISITES TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT TO FURTHER HEAR
THIS CASE. THERE IS A CONSPICUOUS SILENCE IN DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
AS TO WHETHER THOSE PREREQUISITES HAVE BEEN MET.
Plaintiff's original Brief points out that the
Defendant appealed from the original Decree of Divorce in
this matter, which Decree was affirmed by this Court.
v. Klein, 30 Utah2d 1, 511 P.2d 1284 (1973).

Klein

Jurisdiction

to rehear this case is nowhere purported to be based on Sec.
30-3-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), which provides:
The court shall have continuing jurisdiction
to make such subsequent changes or new orders with
respect to the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children and their
support and maintenance, or the distribution of
the property as shall be reasonable and necessary.
To base a reexamination of alimony or property on
this section requires a showing of substantially changed
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-29-

circumstances.

Under no conditions may this prerequisite

to invoking this jurisdictional statute be dispensed with,
Cody v, Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154 P.952 (1916); Anderson v. Anderson,
13 Utah2d 36, 368 P.2d 264 (1962) ; Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah
216, 198 P.2d 233 (1948); Gale v. Gale, 123 Utah 277, 258
P.2d 986 (1953); Carson v. Carson, 87 Utah 1, 47 P.2d 894
(1935); Badger v, Badger, 69 Utah 293, 254 P. 784; Chaffee v.
Chaffee, 63 Utah 261, 225 P. 76; Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 Utah
261, 236 P. 457 18 A.L.R.2d 10. The Defendant has nowhere
asserted substantially changed circumstances since the original
Decree, and the modifying court found none.

Jurisdiction

to rehear this case therefore rests exclusively on the terms
of the original Decree of Divorce dated November 22, 1972,
which reserved limited jurisdiction to be invoked upon the
following conditions:
The court further retains limited jurisdiction
if within one year either party proves to be suffering serious financial distress because of the decree
to be based on this decision and the ensuing
developments arising therefrom not capable of
evaluation and effect at this time the court will
review its rulings and determine whether modifications should be made. (Emphasis added.)
By the terms of the reservation, the following
three prerequisites to jurisdiction are clear, plain and
unavoidable:
1)

that serious financial distress be suffered,

2)

due to ensuing developments

3)

not capable of evaluation at the time
of trial.

This reservation was interpreted by this Court in Klein
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v. Klein, supra, and by Judge Sawaya in his Order of December
7, 1973,

(Record 236.)

Neither interpretation dispenses

in any way with these three jurisdictional prerequisites.
Contrary to the assumption in Defendant's Brief,
the Order of Judge Sawaya emphatically did not grant jurisdiction to modify the original Decree,

It authorized a

hearing of economic matters for the purpose of determining
whether there were grounds for invoking the limited jurisdiction reserved in the original Decree and went no further.
Therefore, jurisdiction to modify the original Decree is based
solely upon Judge Taylor's Findings and Conclusions of November
11, 1974.
As Plaintiff's original Brief points out, beginning
at page 43, the Findings and Conclusions of November 11,
1974, are conclusory and unsupportable by the evidence with
regard to the first jurisdictional prerequisite—the Defendant's

Tf

serious financial distress.M

They contain a mere

conclusion, in Finding No. 7, that the Defendant has suffered
"serious financial distress.M

If this is regarded as a finding

rather than a mere conclusion, it is unsupported by the evidence.
The unrebutted evidence in this case is that the Defendant's
monthly income since the divorce is twice the living allowance
of the entire Klein household prior to the divorce.

The fact

that the Defendant was able to squander this doubled income
and still run up approximately $24,000 in indebtedness in one
and one-half years' time (See Finding No. 6, Findings and Conclusions of November 11, 1974), cannot rationally be considered
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"serious financial distress" within the meaning of the lower
courtfs reservation.
As the Plaintiff's original Brief at page 44 notes,
the Findings and Conclusions of November 11, 1974 contain no
finding or conclusion that even acknowledges, let alone satisfies, the second and third prerequisites to the jurisdiction
of the modifying court — that the Defendant's "serious financial
distress'1 must result from nensuing developments" "not capable
of evaluation at the time of trial."

If these second and third

jurisdictional requirements are disregarded, there is nothing
to differentiate the limited jurisdiction reserved in the original
decree from a complete new trial. The modifying court itself
conceded that if these limitations could not be disregarded,
that it had jurisdiction to reexamine only the contingent assets
of the marital estate that could not be evaluated at the time
of the original trial,

(Record 1568.)

Unless the Defendant's

theory is correct, that "this case is before this (modifying)
Court now in the same posture as it would be if there had not
been any initial decree . . ." (Record 1081), this Court must
remand this cause to a trial court with instructions that the
estate's assets which are not contingent and were fully capable
of being evaluated at the time of trial, such as the corporate
stock and the St. George Sandpiper properties, must be excluded
from its deliberations.
The Plaintifffs original Brief has shown that the
lower courtfs jurisdiction to modify the original Decree of
Divorce rests exclusively upon the terms of the reservation
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of jurisdiction in the original Decree.

The Findings and Con-

clusions of the lower court must, and do not, show that the
Defendant has satisfied the three-fold limitation upon jurisdiction specified therein.

For obvious reasons, the Defendant's

Brief avoids all discussion of the unmet terms of that reservation.
POINT VI
THE CONTENTION IN DEFENDANT'S BRIEF THAT THE SEEGMILLER OPTION WAS EXERCISED WITH THE JOINT ASSETS OF THE PARTIES
IS PLAINLY IN ERROR.
The Defendant's Brief fails to discuss or distinguish
the Plaintiff's authorities which establish the rule that upon
divorce, parties are not entitled to share in marital assets
unless their joint efforts have aided in the accumulation of
those assets. As Plaintiff's original Brief states, the Seegmiller option was originally an option due to expire on May
31, 1972. The Defendant was asked to co-sign the note and
mortgage necessary to raise the $37,000 necessary to exercise
the option.

The Defendant refused.

On May 18, 1972, a Memorandum

Decision of Divorce was entered adopting a proposed property
division in which the Seegmiller property was awarded to the
Plaintiff.

On May 25, 1972, solely on the security of his

share of the marital estate, the Plaintiff borrowed the money
required to exercise the option.

As in the cases cited

at page 46 of Plaintiff's original Brief, the purchase money
was raised during the period when the Plaintiff received
no contribution of any kind, domestic or economic, from the
Defendant.

The claim,in Defendant's Brief that the option
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was e

xercfised with the joint assets of the parties is clearly

false.

The Defendant did not in any way share the consider-

able personal financial risk incurred by the Plaintiff in
order to exercise the option.

But after refusing to share

in the risk of acquiring the Seegmiller property, the Defendant will participate fully in the benefits of the Plaintiff's
efforts, having been awarded,under the modifying Judgments
heretofore entered by the trial court, the beneficial interest
in the Seegmiller property but none of the risks or debts.
The Plaintiff submits that a proper application of the ,!joint
efforts" doctrine, as well as general equitable principles,
require that the Seegmiller property be excluded in whole or
in part from the divisible marital estate.
If the Seegmiller property were excluded from the dis
tributable marital estate and thereby placed at the disposal of
the Plaintiff, the major inequities of which the Plaintiff complains- -the encumbering and fragmenting of the marital estate
which now threatens its viability—would be largely remedied.
POINT VII
THE DEFENDANT'S BRIEF WRONGLY ASSERTS THAT THE ERROR
OF THE TRIAL COURT IN FAILING TO VALUE THE MARITAL ASSETS AS
OF THE DATE OF TRIAL CAUSED NO SIGNIFICANT VARIATION IN
THE PROPERTIES AWARDED TO THE PARTIES.
Plaintiff's original Brief cites the rule, with
supporting authorities, that the marital property must be
evaluated at the time of trial. The rule is so well settled
that the Defendant's Brief does not attempt to challenge
it.

Having, as a practical matter, conceded this error on
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the part of the trial court, the Defendant contends that
it would have made no difference if the proper valuation date
had been used.

One of the estatefs major assets, the Seeg-

miller property, valued by the trial court at $416,000, existe
in the marital estate only as an option until after the trial
and the proposed division of property had been adopted.

There

after, the option was exercised and the property acquired by
the Plaintiff at substantial personal financial risk.

If the

correct valuation date had been adhered to by the modifying
court, only the Seegmiller option, not the substantially more
valuable Seegmiller property itself, would have been valued
and divided by the trial court.
POINT VIII
THE DEFENDANT'S BRIEF LARGELY EVADES DISCUSSION OF
THE ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW UPON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT BASED
ITS VALUATION OF CERTAIN MARITAL ASSETS.
The Plaintiff's contracts receivable from Holidair
Lands calls for payments totaling $504,000 due on or before
January 31, 1986. The Plaintiff's Brief contends that the
law requires contracts receivable to be valued according
to the price it would currently bring on the contracts receivable market.

That this is required by law is not disputed

by the Defendant.

The Plaintiff's contract receivable bears

a low rate of interest.

If discounted to the present to

reflect the current prime interest rate, the present value
of the $504,000 receivable would be $328,800.

If discounted

to reflect the current-competitive interest rate in the
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-1K~

contract receivables market, the present value of the $504,000
receivable is $133,100.

If discounted to reflect the actual

interest rate or actual return on investment that investors
would demand before buying this specific contract receivable,
the present value of the $504,000 receivable would be almost
nothing in view of the fact that the obligor, Holidair Lands,
Inc., is an inactive corporation, generating no income, with
a total of $26.00 in its bank account and receiving only such
funds with which a contract receivable might be paid as its
present stockholders choose to loan to it.
The Defendant's Brief disputes none of this, but
replies instead that the true value of the Plaintiff's contract
receivable is irrelevant since it has not been awarded to the
Defendant.

The approach of Defendant's Brief is interesting.

It declares on the one hand that whether or not the values of the
assets awarded to the Plaintiff are accurate is irrelevant to
the equities of his appeal.

It declares on the other hand that

the lower court Judgments cannot be thought inequitable to the
Plaintiff because they award him two thirds of the marital assets,
assuming that they were correctly valued.
The Plaintiff holds a 49.9% stock interest in three
land development corporations which he founded--Major Enterprises, Inc., Award Homes, Inc. and Dynamic Corporation.

His

stock was not valued by the trial court according to its fair
market value as_ stock.

Instead, it was valued according to

the value of the underlying assets of these corporations.
trial court assigned to this stock a value of approximately
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The

$800,000 (Record 379). The Plaintiff's Brief contends that
the law requires that a non-controlling block of stock in a
closely held corporation be valued according to that stock's
fair market value. Accordingly, as the numerous authorities cited
by Plaintiff's original Brief, beginning at page 52, confirm, the
value of such stock must be based on the various factors affecting
its marketability.

Principal among them are the transferability

of stock, the corporation's net earnings, its net worth, the ability
of the stockholder to liquidate the corporate assets and the marketability of those assets upon liquidation of the corporation.

As

noted in Plaintiff's original Brief, the Plaintiff's stock is re- • *
stricted stock, transferable only to the other shareholders at a
pre-negotiated or an arbitrated price.

The Defendant concedes that

under these circumstances Verl O'Brien is the only available buyer
of the Plaintiff's stock.
6 and 9, 1974.)

(Page 19 of the Proceedings of December

Verl O'Brien is entirely without funds to purchase

additional investments of any kind.

The net earnings and net worth of

Major Enterprises has declined rapidly in recent years. Net
earnings were a minus $46,704.75 for 1974 as compared to a minus
$10,209.65 for 1973.

Current net worth is $124,058 as compared to

$180,108.12 at the close of 1973.

Because the Plaintiff's 49.9%

stock interest is a non-controlling block, he has no power to
liquidate.
It is readily apparent that if the factors which
influence the market price of closely held corporate stock
had been applied to-the Plaintiff's stock, as the law requires, the

-37*"
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value of that stock would have been reduced to a small fraction
of that assigned to it by the trial court.
The Defendant's brief does not contest the rule
of law that a non-controlling block of closely held stock
must be appraised according to that stock's fair market value
rather than its underlying assets.

It merely asserts that

this error of the trial court is irrelevant.

It states at

page 38:

\

The simple facts are that Fifty percent (50%)
of the (Major Enterprises') stock is owned by one
Verl O'Brien and the other Fifty percent (50%) of
the stock stands in the name of the Appellant. This
creates an absolute deadlock situation with respect
to the management of the corporation. Either party
may demand a liquidation of the corporate assets at
any time (Sec. 16-10-92, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as Amended). The continuation of the corporate business
i n corporate form is conditioned upon the continuing
agreement and acquiescence of both Mr. O'Brien and
the Appellant. Under the circumstances, the corporate
stock as such has no market value as a stock (sic).
The

fl

simple fact" cited by the Defendant is manufac-

tured out of thin air.

The Defendant is fully aware that

the "simple facts" are otherwise.
The record is replete with both testimony and documentary
evidence that the Plaintiff owns a minority interest in the
stock of the corporate complex.

The Plaintiff testified

at the original trial before Judge Faux, that he owns 49.9% of
the stock of the corporate complex.

(Record 588-604).

The

Plaintiff's minority stock interest in the corporate complex
is disclosed at ten other locations in the transcript of
the original trial, which transcript the Defendant's counsel
has, according to his own testimony, carefully and thoroughly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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read.

Exhibits 38-P, 39-P and 40-P, introduced into evidence

during the modification hearings of July, 1974, are shareholder
agreements revealing the 49.9% ownership of the Plaintiff in the
stock of the corporate complex.

Exhibit 40-P, for example, shows

the Plaintiff to own 649, Leo Jardine 1, and Verl O'Brien 650
of the 1,300 outstanding shares of Major Enterprises.

While on

the stand, the Plaintiff was asked by the Defendant's counsel
if he did not "as a practical matter11 hold a Fifty percent (50%)
interest in Major Enterprises, which the Plaintiff denied.

(Record

1502).
There were two specific purposes for confining the
Plaintiff to a minority percentage of the corporate complex
stock and awarding one share to Leo Jardine, as evidenced in
Exhibit 38 through 40-D:

to allow the Plaintiff to qualify

as minority shareholder so that he would be entitled to capital
gain treatment under Section 302 of the Internal Revenue Code
upon liquidation of his shares, and to allow Mr. Jardine to
serve as the independent third member of the Board of Directors
whose purpose, among others, was, and is, to break any deadlock
in the management of the corporation that might arise. Mr.
Jardiners share of stock in the corporate complex may not be
transferred to the other shareholders without giving first the
corporation, and then all other shareholders, a right of first
refusal under the shareholder agreements referred to above.
It is readily apparent that the stock ownership of
the corporate complex is so structured as to give to the
Plaintiff a minority interest in substance as well as in form
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and that the distribution of ownership and the composition
of the Board of Directors of the corporate complex has been
carefully structured to avoid a management deadlock.

The

rule of law stating that closely held corporate stock must
be appraised at its fair market value as stock, was violated
by the trial court.

(Record 1573-74).

The Defendant's deadlock

theory by which he sought to evade this rule is transparent,
baseless and entirely unsupported by the evidence.

As a result

of the erroneous valuation of the stock of the three corporations
that make up the corporate complex, the share of the marital estate
awarded the Plaintiff was over-valued by as much as Six Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($600,000).
The Seegmiller property is a 1,181 acre tract of
arid, sagebrush covered desert, several miles from St. George,
Utah.

As Plaintiff's brief points out, at page 55, the validity

of any appraised value of this property depends almost entirely
upon the assumptions made as to the availability and cost of
water.

Without citing the record, the Defendant's brief states

that her expert witness discounted the value of the property
for the unavailability of water.

This is not true.

Her expert

witness assumed that water was available to the Seegmiller property and discounted the value of the property for the cost of
developing it.

The distinction is crucial.

If water is not

available, the Seegmiller property is virtually worthless.

The

Defendant's brief does not dispute that her expert witness was
ruled incompetent to testify regarding the availability of water,
nor that the only competent testimony regarding the availability
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of water was given by the Plaintiff, who, as owner, testified
that water was not available.

By rejecting the Plaintiff's

competent testimony with respect to the availability of water
and accepting the incompetent testimony of the Defendant's witness, the trial court committed reversable error greatly affecting the appraised value of the Seegmiller property.
With respect to the accuracy of the lower court's
values, generally, the Defendant's brief states, at page 39:
...Even though Appellant claims the value
of Major is grossly exaggerated, the Respondent
has always been willing to accept the Major
Enterprises' stock (or for that matter, any
other asset,) by way of distribution to her at
values placed by the Court. The Respondent
has offered and does hereby again offer to
settle this matter by having awarded to her
only the residence and stock in Major Enterprises. We renew such overture. We are
confident that Appellant will not accept
this offer, but Respondent would be pleased
if he did so.
The Plaintiff accepts the Defendant's offer to settle this
matter by transfer of his greatly overvalued stock in Major
Enterprises subject to the rights of the existing shareholders.
In the alternative, he agrees to assign his greatly overvalued
contract receivable from Holidair Lands, Inc. if the Defendant
will credit its $504,000 appraised value to the amount awarded
to her under the judgment of the lower court.
POINT IX
THE DEFENDANT'S BRIEF RELIES UPON MISSTATED FACTS IN
DENYING THAT THE RIGHTS OF ANY THIRD PARTIES TO THIS LAWSUIT .
HAVE BEEN ADJUDICATED BY THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT.
Holidair Lands, Inc. holds title under installment
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land purchase contracts to the "Sandberg" and "Pershing Nelson11
properties.

The Plaintiff owns 82-1/2% and one Richard Rogers

owns 17-1/2% of Holidair Land's outstanding shares.

Both the

judgments of November 11, and of December 18, 1974 impose a
lien in favor of the Defendant as follows:
A lien in favor of Defendant, Klein, is
imposed upon the subject real property and the
contracts to assure the payment of Defendant,
Klein, of the sum of Six Hundred Dollars
($600) per acre prior to the sale or use thereof by Plaintiff, Klein, or Holidair Lands, Inc.
By the terms of the judgment, then, a lien in favor of the Defendant is imposed not only on the Plaintiff's contract receivable
from Holidair Lands, which he owns personally, but a lien
in the amount of Six Hundred Dollars ($600) per acre is
imposed directly upon the installment land purchase contract
rights and directly upon the underlying acreage itself.

These

contracts, and the underlying acreage, are owned exclusively
by Holidair Lands, Inc.
whatever in them.

The Plaintiff has no personal rights

The Defendant's brief contends:

that Holidair Lands, Inc. and its shareholders
(Appellant and one Rogers) do not acquire any title
and interest in and to the land itself except only
from the Appellant, and only at such times as Holidair
Lands pays to Appellant the sum of $1,200 per acre.
In support of her interpretation, the Defendant cites the following provision in the Option Agreement, dated September 21, 1964
(Record 51, and Exhibit 6-D):
The Seller (Plaintiff)
to be selected.by the Buyer
for each $1,200 paid by the
the terms and conditions of
5-D).

shall release one acre
(Holidair Lands, Inc.)
Buyer to the Seller under
this agreement, (Exhibit
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The Defendant has hopelessly misread this provision of the Option
Agreement.

Under this agreement, the Plaintiff divests himself

of all right, title and interest to the installment purchase
contracts and the underlying acreage and Holidair Lands acquires
all right, title and interest to the installment purchase contracts and underlying acreage.

The provision quoted in the

Defendant's brief refers to the security interest retained by the
Plaintiff.

It is clearly this retained security interest alone

that the Plaintiff is to release to Holidair Lands upon the
payment of $1,200 per acre.

Holidair Lands acquired the install-

ment land purchase contracts and the underlying acreage upon
the signing of the Agrement in February, 1971.

It does not

acquire these properties upon payment of $1,200 per acre.
Rather, it obtains only a release of the Plaintiff's lien upon
such acreage by the payment of $1,200 per acre.
The Defendant's contention that Holidair Lands does
n o t acc u r

l i e the installment land purchase contract or the under-

lying acreage, except as the Plaintiff releases them, is groundless.

Therefore, the lien in favor of the Defendant which the

lower court judgment placed directly upon the installment land
purchase contracts and directly upon the underlying acreage,
are liens placed directly upon the assets of Holidair Lands.
Since Holidair Lands is owned in part by Richard Rogers, a third
party, his right to said assets has been encumbered by the
Judgment of the lower court.

This directly violates the rule

of law cited at page 58 of Plaintiff's original brief which
-43-
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forbids a Decree of Divorce- to adjudicate the rights of third
parties.
The lower court's Judgment of December 18, 1974,
required that the Plaintiff's stock in Major Enterprises
be pledged to the court and sold upon Plaintiff's default in
retiring the mortgage on the Seegmiller property or failing
to make installments on the $50,000 awarded to the Defendant.
The Defendant's brief contends that this requirement does not
violate the rights of Verl O'Brien as a 501 shareholder of Major
Enterprises' stock, in the stock owned by the Plaintiff.

She

maintains that the pledge and sale would all be accomplished
subject to Verl O'Brien's rights.
The facts are that no stock in Major Enterprises can
be pledged or sold without violating the restrictions placed
upon that stock by the Shareholder Agreement received as Exhibit
40-P during the July, 1974 modification hearings.

That Agreement

forbids the transfer of any Major Enterprises' stock without
first offering that stock to the corporation itself for thirty
days at a previously negotiated or an arbitrated price, and,
thereafter, offering the stock at a pre-negotiated or arbitrated
price to the corporation's remaining shareholder.

It is obvious

from the restrictions placed upon the Plaintiff's stock by said
Shareholder Agreement that this Agreement prohibits the pledge
of Plaintiff's stock to the court or its sale by the court.
The Defendant states in her brief that the Shareholder
Agreement referred to above is limited to insurance purposes.
A reading of the terms of the Shareholders Agreement does not
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permit the interpretation sought by the Defendant.

One provision

of the Agreement is that the shareholders shall annually negotiate the transfer price of Major Enterprises1 stock.

The specific

values arrived at under this provision were estimations of the
replacement value of either the Plaintiff or Verl O'Brien upon
their death rather than estimates of the current market value
of the shares.

(Record 679-80).

The Defendant has tried to

construe such testimony to mean that the Shareholder Agreement
as a whole was limited to insurance purposes.

This interpre-

tation is untenable in view of trhe terms of the Agreement itself
which comprehensively covers all circumstances under which Major
Enterprises1 stock might be transferred, specifically including
such non-death related circumstances as disability, retirement
and gifts to immediate family members.

The rule of law cited

at page 58 of Plaintiff's brief that a decree of divorce may
not interfere with or adjudicate the rights of third parties
will be violated if the Plaintiff's Major Enterprises stock
is pledged to or sold by the court.
CONCLUSION
The core of the argument made in the Defendant's brief
is that the Plaintiff should not be heard to complain of the
inequity of the Judgments of the modifying court in view of their
award to him of approximately two thirds of a correctly valued
marital estate.

This is not the nature of the inequity of which

Plaintiff most seriously complains.

The most serious injustice

of both lower court Judgments is that they create the extreme
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risk that virtually all of the marital estate will collapse
due to a failure to retire the purchase money debt which now
encumbers it.

Both parties will suffer from this injustice.

Its principal cause is the encumbering and fragmenting of the
business assets of the marital estate in such a way that they
cannot be effectively used as collateral or effectively developed.
There is no other way that the cash needed to preserve this
estate can be obtained.

The lower court Judgments hang over

this marital estate like the sword of Solomon, primed to divide
a child in two to appease both mothers, but sacrificing the
child in the process.
This injustice to both parties can be effectively
avoided by a division of the marital property in the form of
adjustments of the alimony awarded to the Defendant.

Such a

property division would remove the present encumbrances of the
marital estate's business assets, make them whole again, and
allow their development to go forward for the benefit of both
parties.

Property divisions in this form are solidly sanctioned

by precedent where the marital estate includes substantial
speculative assets.

They are especially effective in solving

the equitable problems arising from estates of this kind.
If this court does not conclude that such a division
of property is necessary to avoid manifest injustice to both
parties, the grave errors committed by the lower court with
respect to the values of the Plaintiff's corporate complex stock,
his contract receivables from Holidair Lands and the Seegmiller
property must be corrected by affording the Plaintiff a new
trial of those matters.
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DATED this the

day of September, 1975.
Respectfully submitted,

'" (l
VUlUdtt'
SypiM'^POrrin G. Hatch
Attorney for Appellant
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APPENDIX A
FORMAL ACCEPTANCE
The Defendant, at page 39 of her Brief, has made the
following settlement offer:

\

•••Even though Appellant claims the value of
Major is grossly exaggerated, the Respondent has
always been willing to accept the Major Enterprises1
stock (or for that matter, any other asset,) by way
of distribution to her at values placed by the Court.
The Respondent has offered and does hereby again offer
to settle this matter by having awarded to her only
the residence and stock in Major Enterprises. We renew
such overture. We are confident that Appellant will
not accept this offer, but Respondent would be pleased
if he did so.
The Plaintiff hereby formally accepts the Defendant's

offer to settle this matter by transferring his stock in Major
Enterprises, Inc. to the Defendant, subject to the rights of
existing shareholders.
In the alternative, consistent with the Defendant's
offer to take by way of settlement any marital asset at the value
assigned to it by the lower court, the Plaintiff agrees to transfer to
the Defendant his right to his contract receivable from Holidair
Lands, Inc., valued by the trial court at $504,000.

If the Defen-

dant retains her award under the lower court Judgment of the residence of the parties, valued by the trial court at $103,000,
$7,000 cash awarded her in lieu of the parties' stock in Intermountain Lands Development Corporation, the seven rental units
owned by the parties in the St. George Sandpiper apartment complex, given a net value of $16,500 by the trial court, and the
Willow Creek Country Club membership, valued at $3,500 by the

App, 1
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trial court, the Defendant would receive assets by way of distribution with a total value of $634,000.

This exceeds the value

of the assets awarded to the Defendant by the Judgment of December 18, 1974, which assets had a total value of $625,563.35
according to the Plaintiff's calculation and $552,563.35 according to the Defendant's calculation.

The Plaintiff requests that

this distribution be made and that this matter be disposed of
accordingly.
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